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A Theory of Countercyclical Government Multiplier
By PASCAL MICHAILLAT∗
I develop a New Keynesian model in which a type of government multi-
plier doubles when unemployment rises from 5 percent to 8 percent. This
multiplier indicates the additional number of workers employed when
one worker is hired in the public sector. Graphically, in equilibrium, an
upward-sloping quasi-labor supply intersects a downward-sloping la-
bor demand in a (employment, labor market tightness) plane. Increas-
ing public employment stimulates labor demand, which increases tight-
ness and therefore crowds out private employment. Critically, the quasi-
labor supply is convex. Hence, when labor demand is depressed and un-
employment is high, the increase in tightness and resulting crowding-out
are small.
JEL: E24, E32, E62
A recent literature has argued that the effect of government policy can be different
across stages of the business cycle if the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is
reached during a recession.1 In this paper, I present a New Keynesian model in which the
effect of government policy varies across stages of the business cycle even when the zero
lower bound does not bind.2 I consider a policy in which the government increases the
size of the public-sector workforce. I measure the effect of this policy with the public-
employment multiplier, defined as the additional number of workers employed when one
more worker is employed in the public sector. I find that this multiplier doubles when
the unemployment rate rises from 5 percent to 8 percent.
In the model, the effect of government policy varies over the business cycle because
of the structure of the labor market, adapted from the search-and-matching framework
of Michaillat (2012). Since government and firms hire from the same pool of jobseek-
ers, increasing public employment crowds out private employment. To increase public
employment, the government posts additional vacancies. Furthermore, increasing public
employment mechanically reduces the number of jobseekers. Therefore, increasing pub-
∗ Department of Economics and Centre for Macroeconomics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, Lon-
don, WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: p.michaillat@lse.ac.uk. This paper was previously circulated under the titles “Fiscal
Multipliers over the Business Cycle” and “A Theory of Countercyclical Government-Consumption Multiplier.” I am
deeply indebted to George Akerlof and Yuriy Gorodnichenko for their support and advice. I thank Francesco Caselli,
Varanya Chaubey, Shantanu Dutta, Martin Eichenbaum, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Ethan Ilzetzki, Camille Landais,
David Levine, Daniel Levy, Zachary Liscow, Maury Obstfeld, Evi Pappa, Demian Pouzo, Mark Ritson, David Romer,
Emmanuel Saez, Paolo Surico, Antonella Trigari, Johannes Wieland, and Mark Zbaracki, who provided valuable com-
ments. The paper has also benefited from suggestions made by three referees, and from helpful conversations with semi-
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1See for instance Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012).
2Canzoneri et al. (2012) propose an alternative model in which the effect of government policy varies over the business
cycle. Their model features costly financial intermediation and countercyclical financial frictions.
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lic employment raises labor market tightness—the number of vacancies per jobseeker—
and makes it more costly for firms to hire workers, thus reducing private employment.
The government policy reduces unemployment more effectively in recession than in ex-
pansion because crowding-out is weaker then. The extent of crowding-out is determined
by the amplitude of this increase in labor market tightness. When unemployment is high,
the government needs few vacancies to hire additional workers because the matching
process is congested by jobseekers; moreover, the number of jobseekers is so large that
the vacancies posted and jobseekers hired by the government have little influence on
tightness. Consequently, the increase in tightness is small and crowding-out is weak.
The same mechanism leads to strong crowding-out when unemployment is low and the
matching process is congested by vacancies.
In Section I, I develop a simple search-and-matching model to highlight the key eco-
nomic forces that drive the results. I do comparative steady-states exercises because they
are transparent: they provide an analytical expression for the public-employment mul-
tiplier and can be represented diagrammatically. Indeed, the steady-state equilibrium is
the intersection of an upward-sloping, convex quasi-labor supply curve and a downward-
sloping aggregate labor demand curve in a (employment, labor market tightness) plane.
The quasi-labor supply is the employment rate when labor market flows are balanced,
and the aggregate labor demand is firms’ labor demand plus public employment. The
properties of the curves arise from a standard matching function and a production func-
tion with diminishing marginal returns to labor. I first compare a steady state to another
steady state with one more public worker. The difference in aggregate employment is
the public-employment multiplier. I find that the multiplier is between 0 and 1. In the
diagram, the aggregate labor demand curve shifts outward when public employment is
higher, leading to higher employment and higher tightness. Next, I compare a steady
state to another steady state with a higher wage and thus higher unemployment. I find
that the multiplier is higher when wage and unemployment are higher. In the diagram,
the aggregate labor demand curve shifts inward when the wage is higher, and the con-
vex quasi-labor supply curve is flatter at the equilibrium point. Thus, increasing public
employment leads to a smaller increase in tightness and a larger increase in employment.
In Section II, I embed the search-and-matching model into a New Keynesian model.
I simulate the responses to a range of technology shocks. Unemployment rises after
negative shocks because the real wage is somewhat rigid. I compare the response of
employment when the government hires additional public workers after the shock and
when it does not. The resulting public-employment multiplier doubles from 0.24 to 0.49
when the unemployment rate rises from 5 percent to 8 percent.
The public-employment multiplier is a type of government-consumption multiplier in
that it measures the macroeconomic effect of an increase in government consumption.
It is not the typical government-consumption multiplier, which measures the response
of output to an increase in government purchases of goods from the private sector. It is
nonetheless relevant for policy.3 First, on average from 1947 to 2011 in the US, public
3Public employment has long been recognized as an important component of government consumption. See for
instance Kahn (1931), Finn (1998), Cavallo (2005), and Pappa (2009).
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employment represents 63 percent of government consumption, whereas purchases of
goods from the private sector represent only 37 percent.4 Second, public employment has
been used to stimulate employment in recession, for instance during the Great Depression
by the Roosevelt administration (Neumann, Fishback and Kantor, 2010).
In the model, hiring workers in the public sector is more effective when unemployment
is higher; furthermore, hiring public workers always reduces unemployment whereas
purchasing goods from the private sector has no effect on unemployment. These re-
sults suggest that empirical estimates of multipliers obtained by averaging the effects of
government spending over the business cycle may not apply in recession; moreover, es-
timates obtained by averaging the effects of different types of government spending may
not apply to a particular type of spending. Section III discusses such implications of the
model, and some to its shortcomings.
I. Comparative Steady-States Analysis of the Multiplier
This section builds a simple model that adds public employment to the search-and-
matching framework of Michaillat (2012).5 Comparative steady states show that the
public-employment multiplier is always between 0 and 1, and that it is closer to 1 when
the unemployment rate is higher. Section II complements these analytical results with
numerical results obtained by simulating a temporary increase in public employment at
different stages of the business cycle with a New Keynesian model.
A. A Search-and-Matching Model
LABOR MARKET. — A measure 1 of identical workers participate in a labor market com-
posed of two sectors. The government employs gt < 1 workers in the public sector.
A measure 1 of identical firms employ lt workers in the private sector. Aggregate em-
ployment is nt = lt + gt. At the end of period t − 1, a fraction s of the nt−1 existing
worker-job matches is exogenously destroyed. Workers who lose their job start search-
ing for a new job immediately. At the beginning of period t, ut = 1 − (1 − s) · nt−1
unemployed workers search for a job. Jobseekers apply to jobs randomly, without direct-
ing their search to the private or public sector. Jobseekers who find a job start working
in period t with the (1− s) · nt−1 incumbent workers.
Firms and the government post a total of vt vacancies to hire workers. The number of
matches in period t is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching function: ht = m · uηt · v1−ηt .
The parameter m > 0 measures the effectiveness of matching, and η ∈ (0, 1) is the
elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment. Let θt ≡ vt/ut be the
4In national accounts, government consumption is the cost of producing the services provided by the government,
such as education or health care. Table 3.10.5 in the National Income and Product Accounts, titled “Government Con-
sumption Expenditures and General Government Gross Output,” shows that 55 percent of these production costs are
compensations of public employees, 33 percent are purchases of intermediate goods and services from the private sector,
and 12 percent is consumption of government fixed capital, an inputed rent on capital from which I abstract.
5For other search-and-matching models with public employment, see Quadrini and Trigari (2007), Gomes (2010),
and Burdett (2012).
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labor market tightness. Jobseekers find a job with probability f(θt) = ht/ut = m ·θ1−ηt ,
and vacancies in both sectors are filled at the same rate q(θt) = ht/vt = m · θ−ηt .6
LARGE HOUSEHOLD. — All workers belong to a large household that consumes a final
good and a public good. The household’s time discount factor is β < 1. The final good
is purchased from firms. The public good is provided free of charge by the government.
The household finances its consumption of final good with its income. Employed work-
ers receive a real wage wt taxed at rate τt, unemployed workers receive no income, and
firms distribute their real profits Tt to the household because it owns them. Hence, the
household’s consumption of final good is ct = (1− τt) · wt · nt + Tt.
Given the matching process on the labor market, the household’s employment rate is
(1) nt = (1− s) · nt−1 + [1− (1− s) · nt−1] · f(θt).
In steady state, inflows to unemployment, s · n, equal outflows from unemployment,
[1− (1− s) · n] · f(θ), and the employment rate is a function of labor market tightness
given by
(2) ns(θ) =
f(θ)
s+ (1− s) · f(θ) .
I refer to this function as quasi-labor supply. It translates the search decision of workers
into the employment rate that prevails when the labor market is in steady state. Of course,
in this model there is no active search decision: workers’ search effort is exogenously set
to 1. But it is easy to endogenize the search decision as a function of the flow values of
work and unemployment. In that case, the quasi-labor supply incorporates the optimal
search choice and translates it into a steady-state employment rate.7 The quasi-labor
supply is therefore similar to a conventional labor supply in that it gives the quantity
of labor arising from workers’ optimal choice based on prevailing economic conditions,
especially the return of work relative to non-work (leisure or job search). However, there
is one difference between the two concepts of labor supply. A conventional labor supply
indicates directly workers’ optimal employment choice (number of hours, or number of
workers with indivisible labor). But in presence of matching frictions, workers cannot
directly choose how much they work; they can only choose how much they search for
jobs when they are unemployed. Therefore, the quasi-labor supply indicates the steady-
state employment rate that prevails when workers’ search choice is optimal.
Lemma 1 establishes a few properties of the quasi-labor supply:
LEMMA 1: The function ns(θ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, limθ→+∞ ns(θ) =
1, and limθ→0 ns(θ) = 0.
6Formally, the definition of the matching function includes the restriction that ht ≤ ut, which leads to the restriction
that f(θt) ≤ 1. I suppress these restrictions for notational convenience.
7See Landais, Michaillat and Saez (2010).
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The proof follows from the properties of f(θ). The lemma says that when labor market
flows are balanced and labor market tightness is high, employment is high. The reason
is that jobseekers find jobs quickly when tightness is high.
FIRMS. — Firms produce a final good and sell it on a perfectly competitive market. A
representative firm uses labor lt to produce output yt according to the production function
yt = l
α
t , where α ∈ (0, 1) measures diminishing marginal returns to labor.
The firm pays a real wage wt to its employees. In addition, the firm incurs a cost to
hire workers. In period t, the firm hires lt− (1− s) · lt−1 workers. Posting a vacancy for
one period costs r units of final good, where r > 0 measures resources spent recruiting
workers. I assume no randomness at the firm level: a firm hires a worker with certainty
by opening 1/q(θt) vacancies and spending r/q(θt). Hence, the firm’s real profits in
period t are
lαt − wt · lt −
r
q(θt)
· [lt − (1− s) · lt−1] .
Given {θt}+∞t=0 and {wt}+∞t=0 , the firm chooses {lt}+∞t=0 to maximize the discounted sum
of real profits. In steady state, the optimal employment choice satisfies
α · lα−1 =w + [1− β · (1− s)] · r
q(θ)
.(3)
The firm hires labor until the marginal product of labor, α · lα−1, equals the marginal
cost of labor, which is the sum of the real wage, w, plus the amortized hiring cost,
[1− β · (1− s)]·r/q(θ). The firm’s labor demand is the employment level that solves (3),
expressed as function of labor market tightness and real wage:
ld(θ, w) =
[
1
α
·
{
w + [1− β · (1− s)] · r
q(θ)
}] −1
1−α
.(4)
The aggregate labor demand is the sum of firms’ labor demand and public employment,
expressed a function of labor market tightness, real wage, and public employment:
(5) nd(θ, w, g) = g + ld(θ, w).
Lemma 2 establishes a few properties of the aggregate labor demand:
LEMMA 2: The function nd(θ, w, g) is strictly decreasing in θ andw, limθ→+∞ nd(θ, w, g) =
g, and limθ→0 nd(θ, w, g) = n∗, where n∗ = g + [w/α]
−1
1−α .
The proof follows from the properties of q(θ). The lemma says that firms’ desired em-
ployment is low when the real wage or labor market tightness are high. The reason is
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simple: when the real wage is high, the marginal cost of labor is high; and when tight-
ness is high, the hiring cost is high so the marginal cost of labor is high as well. The
quantity min {1, n∗} is the employment rate that prevails if the recruiting cost, r, is 0. If
n∗ < 1, then the labor market does not converge to full employment when the recruiting
cost converges to 0: jobs are rationed in the sense of Michaillat (2012). Here, jobs are
rationed if w > α · (1− g)α−1.
REAL WAGE. — As in Hall (2005), I assume that the real wage wt is exogenous. Assum-
ing an exogenous real wage is one way to resolve the indeterminacy of wages that arises
in search-and-matching models because worker and firm determine the wage in a situ-
ation of bilateral monopoly.8 This situation arises because worker and firm must share
a positive surplus, created by their matching. The positive surplus arises because the
firm’s marginal product of labor always exceeds the worker’s flow value of unemploy-
ment when they match. In the steady-state equilibrium, firms’ hiring decisions impose
that the real wage falls between the marginal product of labor and the flow value of
unemployment; therefore, the real wage is necessarily pairwise Pareto efficient.
GOVERNMENT. — The government employs gt workers that produce a public good zt
according to the production function zt = σ · gαt , where σ > 0 scales the productivity of
the government relative to that of firms. The government balances its budget each period.
Government expenditures are the compensations of public workers paid at the private-
sector wage, gt ·wt, and the cost incurred by hiring public workers, [gt − (1− s) · gt−1] ·
r/q(θt). To finance the expenditures, the government levies a labor tax that yields τt ·
wt · nt.
B. Steady-State Equilibrium
This section solves for the steady-state equilibrium of the model taking as given the
values w and g of the real wage and public employment. The equilibrium consists of two
endogenous variables, aggregate employment n and labor market tightness θ. Equilib-
rium labor market tightness equalizes quasi-labor supply to aggregate labor demand:
(6) ns(θ) = nd(θ, w, g).
Equilibrium employment is obtained from the aggregate labor demand:
(7) n = nd(θ, w, g),
8The indeterminacy of the wage in a situation of bilateral monopoly was first highlighted by Edgeworth (1881) and
was discussed by Howitt and McAfee (1987), Pissarides (1989), and Hall (2005) in the context of search-and-matching
models. Since the work of Diamond (1982) and Mortensen (1982), the common way to resolve the indeterminacy in
search-and-matching models is to set the wage using the Nash bargaining solution.
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where θ satisfies (6). Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Figure 1(a) depicts the equilibrium in a (n, θ) plane.9 The quasi-labor supply curve is
upward sloping and convex. The aggregate labor demand curve is downward sloping.
The aggregate labor demand curve intersects the x-axis at n∗. Quasi-labor supply curve
and aggregate labor demand curve intersect at the equilibrium point.
Equilibrium is reached through posting of vacancies. Imagine that aggregate labor
demand is greater than quasi-labor supply. Then, firms and government post additional
vacancies to hire more workers. On the one hand, more jobseekers find a job. On the
other hand, the vacancy-filling rate falls such that the hiring cost rises and the number
of workers desired by firms falls. As a result, the gap between demand and supply
diminishes. Firms and government post more and more vacancies until the gap between
demand and supply is completely closed.
C. Low-Unemployment and High-Unemployment Steady States
This section studies steady-state equilibria that differ by the value w of the real wage.
This comparative steady-states exercise is useful because in the context of business cycles
generated by a combination of technology shocks and real wage rigidity (as in Section II),
the key difference between expansions and recessions corresponds to a difference in w.
To simplify the derivations, I assume that a change in the value w of the real wage is
mechanically accompanied by a change in the value g of public employment. More
precisely, I assume that across steady-state equilibria parameterized by different w, the
ratio of public employment to private employment is constant: g/l = ζ, where ζ > 0 is
a parameter.10
Lemma 3 establishes how the labor market changes across steady-state equilibria pa-
rameterized by different w:
LEMMA 3: The labor market variables satisfy dθ/dw < 0, dl/dw < 0, dn/dw < 0,
and du/dw > 0.
The lemma says that in a steady state in which the real wage is high, labor market tight-
ness, private employment, and aggregate employment are low, and unemployment is
high. Appendix A contains the proof of the lemma, but the main idea can be seen graph-
ically by comparing the steady state with high wage depicted in Figure 1(b) to the steady
state with low wage depicted in Figure 1(a). In the high-wage steady state, the aggregate
labor demand is depressed. Accordingly, the aggregate labor demand curve is located
inward. Hence, in equilibrium, labor market tightness and employment are low, and un-
employment is high. The high-wage steady state mimics a recession, and conversely, the
low-wage steady state mimics an expansion.
9Landais, Michaillat and Saez (2010) introduced this representation to study optimal unemployment insurance.
10This assumption is perhaps unrealistic, and I will relax it in the simulations in Section II.
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FIGURE 1. STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIA IN THE SEARCH-AND-MATCHING MODEL
D. Public-Employment Multiplier
In this section, I take the economy in a steady state, increase the value g of public
employment, compute the new steady state, and compare employment in the two steady
states. Then, I study how the change in employment depends on the value w of the real
wage in the initial steady state.
I measure the difference in employment between the two steady states by a multiplier:
DEFINITION 1: The public-employment multiplier λ is the additional number of work-
ers employed when one additional worker is employed in the public sector:
λ ≡ ∂n
∂g
.
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Proposition 1 establishes some properties of the public-employment multiplier:
PROPOSITION 1: The public-employment multiplier λ satisfies three properties: (i) λ <
1; (ii) λ > 0; and (iii) dλ/dw > 0.
Part (i) shows that the multiplier is less than 1. In other words, increasing public em-
ployment necessarily crowds out private employment. This result is illustrated in Fig-
ures 1(c) and 1(d). After an increase in public employment, the aggregate labor demand
curve shifts outward. At the current tightness, the quasi-labor supply falls short of the
aggregate labor demand. To reach a new equilibrium, tightness increases. Thus, the
vacancy-filling rate falls and the hiring cost rises. As a consequence, firms reduce em-
ployment.
Part (ii) shows that the multiplier is positive. In other words, increasing public employ-
ment crowds out private employment strictly less than one-for-one, and it necessarily
stimulates aggregate employment. If crowding-out were one-for-one, the new equilib-
rium would have the same labor market tightness but lower private employment. The
marginal cost of labor would be the same, but the marginal product of labor would be
higher by diminishing marginal returns to labor; therefore, the firm’s optimal employ-
ment choice would be violated. To conclude, crowding-out is strictly less than one-for-
one.
Part (iii) shows that the multiplier is higher in steady states in which the real wage is
higher. In other words, in steady states in which the aggregate labor demand is weaker
and unemployment is higher, crowding-out is weaker, and increasing public employment
reduces unemployment more effectively. This result is illustrated by comparing the high-
wage steady state in Figure 1(d) to the low-wage steady state in Figure 1(c). In the high-
wage steady-state, the quasi-labor supply is flat at the equilibrium point. Thus, a shift in
the aggregate labor demand curve following an increase in public employment leads to
a small increase in tightness and a large increase in employment. That is, crowding-out
is weak and the multiplier is large. On the contrary, in the low-wage steady-state, the
quasi-labor supply is steep at the equilibrium point. Thus, the shift in the aggregate labor
demand curve leads to a large increase in tightness and a small increase in employment.
That is, crowding-out is strong and the multiplier is small.
Part (iii) can also be explained by thinking directly about vacancies and the match-
ing process. To increase public employment, the government posts additional vacancies.
Furthermore, increasing public employment mechanically reduces the number of job-
seekers. Therefore, increasing public employment raises labor market tightness—the
number of vacancies per jobseeker. The extent of crowding-out is determined by the
amplitude of this increase in labor market tightness. When unemployment is high, the
government needs few vacancies to hire additional workers because the matching pro-
cess is congested by jobseekers; moreover, the number of jobseekers is so large that the
vacancies posted and jobseekers hired by the government have little influence on tight-
ness. Consequently, the increase in tightness is small and crowding-out is weak. On the
contrary, when unemployment is low, the government needs many vacancies to hire ad-
ditional workers because the matching process is congested by vacancies; moreover, the
number of jobseekers is small such that the vacancies posted and jobseekers hired by the
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government have a large influence on tightness. Consequently, the increase in tightness
is large and crowding-out is strong.
The complete proof of the proposition is relegated to Appendix A, but I provide a
sketch here. Let s ≡ (θ/ns) · (∂ns/∂θ) > 0 and d ≡ − (θ/nd) · (∂nd/∂θ) > 0 be the
elasticities of quasi-labor supply and aggregate labor demand with respect to tightness.
(The elasticities are normalized to be positive.) Implicit differentiation of equations (6)
and (7) yields
λ = 1− 1
1 + (s/d)
.(8)
The increase in aggregate employment equals the increase in public employment atten-
uated by a factor 1/
[
1 +
(
s/d
)]
. This factor measures the crowding-out of private
employment. The proof shows that λ ∈ (0, 1) because both s and d are positive and fi-
nite. The proof also shows that s is proportional to unemployment and d is proportional
to the share of the hiring cost in the marginal cost of labor. Since this share decreases
with unemployment, both s/d and λ are larger when unemployment is higher.
Matching frictions and diminishing marginal returns to labor are critical for the results
in Proposition 1. Without matching frictions, the multiplier would be 1 in any steady
state. For instance, imagine that there is no recruiting cost (r = 0). Then the aggregate
labor demand does not depend on θ. In Figures 1(c) and 1(d), the aggregate labor demand
curve is vertical. There is no crowding-out. As a result, the multiplier is 1. Formally, the
aggregate labor demand is inelastic so d = 0, crowding-out is 1/
[
1 +
(
s/d
)]
= 0,
and λ = 1.
With constant returns to labor instead of diminishing marginal returns, the multiplier
would be 0 in any steady state. With constant returns to labor (α = 1), the firm’s optimal
employment choice solely determines equilibrium tightness. Combined with the quasi-
labor supply, equilibrium tightness determines equilibrium employment independent of
public employment. Since aggregate employment is independent of public employment,
an increase in public employment must be offset by a commensurate decrease in private
employment. As a result, the multiplier is 0. Formally, the aggregate labor demand is
perfectly elastic so d = +∞, crowding-out is 1/ [1 + (s/d)] = 1, and λ = 0.
To conclude, I connect the results in Proposition 1 to the results in Michaillat (2012).
These sets of results are distinct even though they rely on the same ingredients—variations
in real wage and diminishing marginal returns to labor. Proposition 4 in Michaillat (2012)
establishes a property of the model based on its behavior at the limit where matching fric-
tions vanish. It shows that when the real wage is high enough, the labor market does not
converge to full employment when the recruiting cost converges to 0. Figure 1(b) illus-
trates the property. The aggregate labor demand intersects the x-axis below 1; thus, it
is not profitable for firms to hire all the workers even when recruiting is costless—jobs
are rationed. On the other hand, Proposition 1 in this paper establishes a property of
the model based on the behavior of the slope of the quasi-labor supply, measured by s,
relative to the slope of the aggregate labor demand, measured by d. The behavior of
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE A THEORY OF COUNTERCYCLICAL GOVERNMENT MULTIPLIER 11
s/d determines the behavior of the public-employment multiplier.
II. Multiplier Dynamics
This section uses simulations to explore the effect of a temporary increase in public
employment at different stages of the business cycle. To improve realism, the search-
and-matching model of the previous section is embedded into a New Keynesian model.
Simulations of this model calibrated to US data confirm the comparative steady-states
results: the public-employment multiplier is positive and countercyclical.
A. A New Keynesian Model
OVERVIEW. — This model embeds the search-and-matching model of Section I; there-
fore, the model presents three departures from the textbook New Keynesian model. First,
since government consumption arises not from purchases of goods from the private sec-
tor but from compensations of public employees, government consumption appears not
in the resource constraint but in the aggregate labor demand. Second, monopolistic firms
are subject not to the price-setting friction of Calvo (1983) but to the quadratic price-
adjustment cost of Rotemberg (1982); therefore, the Phillips curve admits a different
expression. I introduce a quadratic price-adjustment cost because it yields a closed-form
expression for the Phillips curve, which simplifies the simulations.11 Third, the labor
market is not perfectly competitive but adopts a search-and-matching structure.12 This
departure introduces four modifications to the model. First, the labor supply is replaced
by the quasi-labor supply. Second, firms’ labor demand accounts for hiring cost. Third,
the model counts one more variable: labor market tightness, determined by the equality
of quasi-labor supply and aggregate labor demand. Fourth, the model counts one more
equation: a rule that shares the surplus arising from each worker-firm match and thus
determines the real wage.
SHOCK. — Business cycles are driven by technology, modeled as a stochastic process
{at}+∞t=0 .
LABOR MARKET. — The private sector is now composed of a continuum of intermediate-
good firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Firm i employs lt(i) workers. Private employment is
lt =
∫ 1
0 lt(i)di.
11Braun, Ko¨rber and Waki (2012) also take advantage of the simplicity brought by this price-adjustment cost to com-
pute the equilibrium of a nonlinear model of the zero lower bound. For other New Keynesian models using this price-
adjustment cost, see Hairault and Portier (1993), Che´ron and Langot (2000), and Krause, Lopez-Salido and Lubik (2008).
12Several New Keynesian models add matching frictions to the labor market. See Galı´ (2010) for an overview.
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LARGE HOUSEHOLD. — The large household has expected utility
(9) E0
+∞∑
t=0
βt · [ln(ct) + χ · ln(zt)] ,
where E0 is the expectation conditional on period-0 information, and χ measures the
taste for public good. Workers pool their income before choosing consumption and sav-
ing.13 The household’s budget constraint becomes
(10) pt · ct + bt = pt · nt · (1− τt) · wt +Rt−1 · bt−1 + pt · Tt,
where pt is the price level, bt is the quantity of one-period bonds purchased at time t,
and Rt−1 is the one-period gross nominal interest rate that pays off in period t. The
household chooses consumption {ct}+∞t=0 to maximize (9) subject to (10) and the no-
Ponzi-game constraint
E0
[
lim
t→+∞
bt
Πti=0Ri−1
]
≥ 0.
Let pit ≡ (pt/pt−1)−1 be the inflation rate at time t. The household’s optimal consump-
tion path is governed by the Euler equation
1 = β · Et
[
Rt
1 + pit+1
· ct
ct+1
]
.(11)
FINAL-GOOD FIRMS. — A measure 1 of identical firms produce the final good and sell it
on a perfectly competitive market. The representative final-good firm uses yt(i) units of
each intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1] to produce yt units of final good using the production
function
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(−1)/di
]/(−1)
,
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods.
The final-good firm takes as given the nominal price pt(i) of each intermediate good
i ∈ [0, 1] and the nominal price pt of the final good. The firm chooses yt(i) for all
i ∈ [0, 1] to maximize its profits
pt ·
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(−1)/di
]/(−1)
−
∫ 1
0
pt(i) · yt(i)di.
13This formulation is standard since Merz (1995). It avoids the complications that would arise if workers had hetero-
geneous wealth levels that depended on their employment histories.
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The first-order condition with respect to yt(i) is
(12) yt(i) = yt ·
(
pt(i)
pt
)−
.
This equation describes the demand for intermediate good i as a function of the relative
price pt(i)/pt.
Perfect competition in the final-good market requires that the price of the final good
equals its marginal cost of production:
pt =
(∫ 1
0
pt(i)
1−di
)1/(1−)
.
INTERMEDIATE-GOOD FIRMS. — There is no entry or exit into the production of interme-
diate goods. Intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a monopolist. The monopolist
uses lt(i) units of labor to produce yt(i) units of intermediate good i according to the
production function
yt(i) = at · lt(i)α,(13)
where at is the state of technology and α ∈ (0, 1) measures diminishing marginal returns
to labor.
As in Rotemberg (1982), the monopolist incurs a cost to adjust its nominal price given
by
φ
2
·
(
pt(i)
pt−1(i)
− 1
)2
· ct,
where φ > 0 captures resources devoted to adjusting prices. The price-adjustment cost
is measured in units of final good, and it increases proportionally with the size of the
economy, measured by consumption ct. The monopolist also incurs a cost r · at to post
a vacancy for one period; therefore, it incurs a total cost [lt(i)− (1− s) · lt−1(i)] · r ·
at/q(θt) to hire new workers in period t. The hiring cost is measured in units of final
good, and it increases proportionally with the state of technology at.
The monopolist chooses {lt(i)}+∞t=0 and {pt(i)}+∞t=0 to maximize the expected sum of
discounted real profits
E0
+∞∑
t=0
βt
ct
·
{
pt(i)
pt
· yt(i)− wt · lt(i)
− φ
2
·
(
pt(i)
pt−1(i)
− 1
)2
· ct − r · at
q(θt)
· [lt(i)− (1− s) · lt−1(i)]
}
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subject to (12) and (13). The discount factor βt/ct indicates the value of one unit of final
good in period t from the perspective of the household in time 0. The Lagrangian is
E0
+∞∑
t=0
βt
ct
·
{(
pt(i)
pt
)1−
· yt − wt · lt(i)− φ
2
·
(
pt(i)
pt−1(i)
− 1
)2
· ct
− r · at
q(θt)
· [lt(i)− (1− s) · lt−1(i)] + Λt(i) ·
[
at · lt(i)α −
(
pt(i)
pt
)−
· yt
]}
,
where Λt(i) is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (13) in period t. The multiplier
Λt(i) is the real marginal revenue of producing one unit of intermediate good i in period
t. The first-order condition with respect to lt(i) is
Λt(i) · α · lt(i)α−1 = wt
at
+
r
q(θt)
− β · (1− s) · Et
[
ct
ct+1
· at+1
at
· r
q(θt+1)
]
.(14)
The first-order condition with respect to pt(i) is
pt(i)
pt
=

− 1 · Λt(i) +
φ
− 1 ·
ct
yt
·
(
pt(i)
pt
)
·
[
β · Et
[(
pt+1(i)
pt(i)
− 1
)
· pt+1(i)
pt(i)
]
−
(
pt(i)
pt−1(i)
− 1
)
· pt(i)
pt−1(i)
]
.(15)
REAL WAGE. — As in Blanchard and Galı´ (2010), the real wage is a simple function of
technology:
wt = ω · aγt ,(16)
where ω governs the level of the real wage and γ governs its response to technology.
Below, I discuss microeconometric estimates of γ obtained in US data. They indicate
that γ < 1. In other words, the real wage is somewhat rigid in that it does not respond
one-for-one to technology. This rigidity may be explained by the existence of several
barriers that slow down the adjustment of wages to changes in productivity. A first
barrier is the organization of firms around internal labor markets that tie wages to job
descriptions.14 Another barrier is the common practice of not cutting wages. Managers
are reluctant to cut wages because they think that wage cuts antagonize workers and thus
reduce profitability.15
14For an historical account of the evolution of firms’ organization, see Jacoby (1984). For descriptions of internal
labor markets, see Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994).
15For surveys of managers about wage-setting practices, see Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and especially Bewley
(1999). For empirical evidence that wage cuts reduce productivity, see Mas (2006).
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MONETARY POLICY. — Monetary policy sets the gross nominal interest rate to
Rt =
1
β
· (1 + pit)µpi ·(1−µR) · (β ·Rt−1)µR ,(17)
where pit is the inflation rate at time t, µR ∈ [0, 1) measures interest-rate smoothing, and
µpi > 1 measures the response of monetary policy to inflation. I assume that steady-state
inflation is zero. The steady-state gross nominal interest rate is 1/β.
GOVERNMENT’S BUDGET CONSTRAINT AND RESOURCE CONSTRAINT. — Each period, the
government services the debt inherited from the previous period, which costsRt−1 ·bt−1,
and it issues new debt, which brings bt. Therefore, the budget constraint becomes
nt · τt · wt + bt
pt
= gt · wt + r · at
q(θt)
· [gt − (1− s) · gt−1] + Rt−1
pt
· bt−1.
Using the household’s budget constraint and the definition of profits, I rewrite the gov-
ernment’s budget constraint as the resource constraint:
yt = ct ·
(
1 +
φ
2
· pi2t
)
+
r · at
q(θt)
· [nt − (1− s) · nt−1] .(18)
The resource constraint says that the final good is consumed or allocated to changing
prices or allocated to hiring workers.
SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM. — In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate-good firms
are identical. For all i ∈ [0, 1], lt(i) = lt, yt(i) = yt, and pt(i) = pt. Let Λt be the real
marginal revenue of producing one unit of intermediate good. Given initial employment
n−1, initial bond holding b−1, and stochastic processes {at, gt}+∞t=0 , a symmetric equi-
librium is a collection of ten stochastic processes {wt, θt, nt, lt,Λt, pit, ct, yt, Rt, bt}+∞t=0
that satisfy ten relationships: the wage schedule, given by (16); the quasi-labor supply,
given by (1); the aggregate labor demand, nt = lt + gt; firms’ labor demand, deriving
from (14) and given by
Λt · α · lα−1t =
wt
at
+
r
q(θt)
− β · (1− s) · Et
[
ct
ct+1
· at+1
at
· r
q(θt+1)
]
;(19)
the Phillips curve, deriving from (15) and given by
pit · (pit + 1) = 1
φ
· yt
ct
· [ · Λt − (− 1)] + β · Et [pit+1 · (pit+1 + 1)] ;
the household’s budget constraint, given by (10); the Euler equation, given by (11); the
monetary policy rule, given by (17); the production function, yt = at·lαt ; and the resource
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constraint, given by (18).
The zero-inflation steady state of the New Keynesian model is isomorphic to the steady
state studied in Section I. The steady state of the New Keynesian model is indeed given
by the intersection of a quasi-labor supply and an aggregate labor demand, the sum of
firms’ labor demand and public employment. The quasi-labor supply remains given by
(2). With zero inflation, the Phillips curve implies that Λ = (−1)/. Hence, firms’ labor
demand satisfies (4) except for two changes: the marginal cost of labor is multiplied by
a markup 1/Λ = /( − 1) > 1 because intermediate-good firms have some monopoly
power; and the real wage is replaced by the ratio w/a because marginal product of labor
and hiring cost are proportional to technology a. With some wage rigidity (γ < 1),
w/a = ω · aγ−1 increases when technology falls; therefore, a steady state with low
technology corresponds to a steady state with high real wage from Section I.
B. Calibration
I calibrate the New Keynesian model to US data. I take one period to be one week.
Table 1 summarizes the calibration of all the parameters.
I calibrate a few parameters using conventional values. I set the production function
parameter to α = 0.66; the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods to  = 11,
which yields a monopolistic markup of 1.1; and the discount factor to β = 0.999, which
yields an annual interest rate of 5 percent.
Next, I calibrate the labor market parameters. I set the elasticity of the matching func-
tion with respect to unemployment at η = 0.7, in line with empirical evidence (Petron-
golo and Pissarides, 2001). As Michaillat (2012), I set the recruiting cost to r = 0.32 ·ω,
where ω is the steady-state real wage. This estimate is constructed from microevidence
collected by Barron, Berger and Black (1997) and Silva and Toledo (2009). I estimate
the job-destruction rate from the average of the seasonally-adjusted monthly total sepa-
ration rate in all nonfarm industries constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). All nonfarm industries
include the nonfarm private sector and the government sector (federal, state, and local
government). The monthly separation rate averages 0.036 from 2001 to 2011, so I set
the weekly job-destruction rate to s = 0.036/4 = 0.009. I calibrate the elasticity of the
real wage with respect to technology from microeconometric estimates of the elasticity
for wages in newly created jobs—the elasticity that matters for job creations (Pissarides,
2009). In panel data following production and supervisory workers from 1984 to 2006,
Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2008) find an elasticity of total earnings of job movers
with respect to productivity of 0.7.16 If the composition of the jobs accepted by workers
improves in expansion, 0.7 is an upper bound on the elasticity of wages in newly created
jobs (Gertler and Trigari, 2009). A lower bound is the elasticity of wages in existing jobs,
estimated between 0.1 and 0.45 (Pissarides, 2009). Hence I set γ = 0.5, in the range of
plausible values. Since γ < 1, the real wage is somewhat rigid. In the simulations, I
16See Table 6, Panel A, column 4 in Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2008).
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TABLE 1—CALIBRATION OF THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL (WEEKLY FREQUENCY)
Steady-state target Value Source
a Technology 1 Normalization
u Unemployment 0.064 JOLTS, 2001–2011
θ Labor market tightness 0.43 JOLTS and CPS, 2001–2011
g/n Share of public employment in total employment 0.167 CES, 2001–2011
Parameter Value Source
η Elasticity of matching function to unemployment 0.7 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
r Recruiting cost 0.21 Barron, Berger and Black (1997), Silva and
Toledo (2009)
s Job-destruction rate 0.009 JOLTS, 2001–2011
γ Elasticity of real wage to technology 0.5 Pissarides (2009), Haefke, Sonntag and
Van Rens (2008)
µpi Elasticity of monetary rule to inflation 1.5 Convention
µR Elasticity of monetary rule to lag interest rate 0.962 Yields a quarterly elasticity of 0.6
φ Price-adjustment cost 61 Zbaracki et al. (2004)
ρ Autocorrelation of technology 0.992 MSPC, 1947–2011
α Marginal returns to labor 0.66 Convention
β Discount factor 0.999 Yields an annual interest rate of 5 percent
 Elasticity of substitution across goods 11 Yields a monopolistic markup of 1.1
m Matching effectiveness 0.17 Matches steady-state targets
ω Real-wage level 0.64 Matches steady-state targets
ensure that wage rigidity never cause the destruction of existing worker-firm matches.17
I then calibrate the monetary parameters. I set the parameters of monetary policy to
µpi = 1.5 and µR = 0.962, corresponding to 0.6 at quarterly frequency. These values are
standard. I calibrate the price-adjustment cost from microevidence collected by Zbaracki
et al. (2004). Using time-and-motion methods, they study the pricing process of a large
industrial firm. They find that the physical, managerial, and customer costs of changing
prices amount to 1.22 percent of the firm’s revenue in a given year. The firm changed the
price of 25 percent of its products that year, and most prices changed by about 4 percent,
so I set φ = 61.18
I assume that log technology follows an AR(1) process: log(at+1) = ρ·log(at)+νt+1,
where the error term νt+1 is a centered normal random variable. I construct log technol-
ogy as a residual log(at) = log(yt)−α · log(lt), where yt and lt are seasonally-adjusted
quarterly real output and employment in the nonfarm business sector for the 1947–2011
period, constructed by the BLS Major Sector Productivity and Costs (MSPC) program.
To isolate fluctuations at business-cycle frequency, I take the difference between log tech-
nology and a low-frequency trend—a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter
17Thus, wages are always pairwise Pareto efficient, and this wage rigidity is immune to the critique of Barro (1977).
18To obtain φ, I solve φ/2 · (0.04)2 · 0.25 = 0.0122. The value φ = 61 is similar to the maximum-likelihood
estimate obtained by Ireland (2001) with a New Keynesian model.
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105. I estimate a quarterly autocorrelation of 0.897, so I set the weekly autocorrelation
to ρ = 0.992.
To calibrate the remaining parameters, I set the steady-state value of some variables to
the average of their empirical counterpart. Let x be the steady-state value of x. I normal-
ize steady-state technology to a = 1. I compute labor market tightness as the ratio of the
seasonally-adjusted monthly vacancy level constructed by the BLS from the JOLTS to
the seasonally-adjusted monthly unemployment level constructed by the BLS from the
Current Population Survey (CPS). Taking the average from 2001 to 2011, I set θ = 0.43.
Similarly, I set u = 0.064, which implies n = (1 − u)/(1 − s) = 0.945. I compute
the share of public employment in total employment using seasonally-adjusted monthly
data from the BLS Current Employment Survey (CES). Public employment is employ-
ment in the government supersector, including federal, state, and local government. Total
employment is the sum of public employment and employment in the total private super-
sector. The share of public employment averaged 16.7 percent from 2001 to 2011, which
implies that g = 0.167 · n = 0.157 and l = n − g = 0.788. I calibrate the matching
effectiveness from the equality of unemployment inflows and outflows in steady state:
m = s · n · θη−1/u = 0.17. I calibrate the real-wage level from the optimal employment
choice (19): ω = [(− 1)/] · α · lα−1/{1 + [1− β · (1− s)] · 0.32/q(θ)} = 0.64. I
recover r = 0.32 · ω = 0.21.
C. Simulations
Using a shooting algorithm, I simulate an approximation of the calibrated New Key-
nesian model in which firms and workers have perfect foresight. Since the aim of the
simulations is to quantify the nonlinearity of the model once the economy departs from
its steady state, I cannot follow the standard procedure of simulating the log-linear ap-
proximation of the model.
I begin by simulating an expansion. At time 0, the economy is in steady state. At
time 1, an unexpected positive technology shock ν1 = +0.054 occurs. After that, no
other shock occurs and technology converges back to its steady-state value. Let xˆt be
the value of variable x at time t. For all t ≥ 1, log (aˆt) = ρt−1 · ν1. Public employment
remains constant over time: gˆt = g for all t ≥ 1, where g is steady-state public employ-
ment. The government maintains public employment constant by hiring s · g workers
each period. Under perfect foresight, workers and firms do not face any uncertainty:
they perfectly anticipate the time path of all relevant variables after time 1.
The solid lines in Figure 2 are the responses to the positive technology shock. At
time 1, technology increases, but the real wage increases only partially because of wage
rigidity. Relative to technology, the marginal cost of labor falls. In response, firms
post more vacancies to hire more workers. Thus, labor market tightness increases, and
private employment builds up and peaks after 20 weeks. Consequently, unemployment
drops and bottoms at 5.0 percent after 20 weeks. I also plot the response of the gross
domestic product (GDP). As in national accounts, I define GDP as output of final good
plus government consumption: GDP is yt +wt · gt + [gt − (1− s) · gt−1] · r · at/q(θt).
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FIGURE 2. RESPONSES TO A POSITIVE TECHNOLOGY SHOCK
Note: The solid lines are the responses to an unexpected positive technology shock of +5.4 percent. The dashed lines are
the responses to an unexpected positive technology shock of +5.4 percent accompanied by the unexpected hiring of 0.5
percent of the labor force in the public sector. The response are obtained by simulating an approximation of the calibrated
New Keynesian model in which firms and workers have perfect foresight.
At time 1, GDP mechanically increases because technology and thus output increase.
GDP further increases in the next 10 weeks because private employment and thus output
increase.
To quantify the effect of an increase in public employment during an expansion, I
simulate the model when at time 1, the unexpected positive technology shock is accom-
panied by the unexpected hiring of 0.5 percent of the labor force in the public sector. Let
x∗t be the value of variable x at time t. At time 1, g∗1 = gˆ1 + 0.005. After that, the gov-
ernment hires as many workers as in the previous simulation: g∗t − (1− s) · g∗t−1 = s · g
for all t ≥ 2. Under perfect foresight, workers and firms perfectly anticipate the time
path of public employment after time 1.
The dashed lines in Figure 2 are the responses to the positive technology shock ac-
companied by the increase in public employment. At time 1, the government posts more
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FIGURE 3. RESPONSES TO A NEGATIVE TECHNOLOGY SHOCK
Note: The solid lines are the responses to an unexpected negative technology shock of -3.6 percent. The dashed lines are
the responses to an unexpected negative technology shock of -3.6 percent accompanied by the unexpected hiring of 0.5
percent of the labor force in the public sector. The response are obtained by simulating an approximation of the calibrated
New Keynesian model in which firms and workers have perfect foresight.
vacancies to hire additional workers in the public sector. As a result, public employment
and labor market tightness rise above their previous level. Because labor market tight-
ness increases, it is more costly for intermediate-good firms to recruit workers. Thus,
the marginal cost of labor rises, firms reduce hiring, and private employment falls below
its previous level. In other words, public employment crowds out private employment.
Nonetheless, the net effect of an increase in public employment is positive because un-
employment falls below its previous level.
To quantify the effect of an increase in public employment during a recession, I repeat
the two previous simulations but replace the unexpected positive technology shock by
an unexpected negative technology shock ν1 = −0.036. The results are displayed in
Figure 3. At time 1, technology decreases, but the real wage decreases only partially
because of wage rigidity. Relative to technology, the marginal cost of labor increases. In
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response, firms post fewer vacancies. Thus, labor market tightness, private employment,
and GDP fall whereas unemployment increases. Qualitatively, an increase in public em-
ployment has the same effect in expansion and recession; but quantitatively, the effects
are different. In the expansion of Figure 2, tightness increases by 0.07 from 1.15 to 1.22
after the increase in public employment; in the recession of Figure 3, it only increases by
0.02 from 0.14 to 0.16. Hence, the resulting increase in hiring cost is much larger in ex-
pansion than in recession: in the expansion, the expected number of vacancies required
to hire a worker increases by 0.27 from 6.41 to 6.68; in the recession, it only increases
by 0.16 from 1.47 to 1.64. Thus, crowding-out is larger in expansion than in recession:
in the expansion, private employment falls by 0.35 percentage points from 80.29 percent
to 79.94 percent at its extremum; in the recession, it only falls by 0.18 percentage points
from 77.18 percent to 77.00 percent. To conclude, increasing public employment re-
duces unemployment more effectively in recession than in expansion: in the expansion,
unemployment only falls by 0.08 percentage points from 4.94 percent to 4.86 percent at
its extremum; in the recession, it falls by 0.24 percentage points from 8.02 percent to
7.78 percent.
To measure the period-by-period effect of an increase in public employment, I compute
the instantaneous multiplier at time t. This multiplier is defined as (n∗t − nˆt) / (g∗t − gˆt),
where nˆt and gˆt are employment levels before government intervention, and n∗t and g∗t
are levels after intervention. To isolate the marginal effect of an increase in public em-
ployment, {n∗t } and {g∗t } are obtained by hiring only 0.01 percent of the labor force in
the public sector at time 1. The multiplier gives the number of jobs created in period t
for each job added to the public sector in that period. Figure 4(a) shows the response
of the instantaneous multiplier to a positive technology shock ν1 = +0.054, and Fig-
ure 4(b) shows the response to a negative technology shock ν1 = −0.036. At time 1, the
instantaneous multiplier is small in both cases. After the positive shock, the multiplier
grows slowly to reach a steady-state value of 0.38. The increase of the multiplier concurs
with the increase in unemployment when unemployment reverts to its steady-state level.
After the negative shock, the multiplier grows quickly and peaks at 0.58 after 30 weeks.
The peak of the multiplier broadly concurs with the peak of unemployment. After the
peak, unemployment and multiplier revert to their steady-state levels.
To summarize the effect of an increase in public employment after a given technology
shock, I compute the cumulative multiplier. This multiplier is defined as
(20)
∑T
t=0 (n
∗
t − nˆt)∑T
t=0 (g
∗
t − gˆt)
,
where T = 15, 000 is the horizon in the shooting algorithm, long enough for the model
to converge back to steady state. The multiplier measures the total number of job×weeks
created by hiring workers in the public sector divided by the number of job×weeks added
to the public sector. This multiplier accounts for the persistence of public employment,
arising because public workers cannot be dismissed such that public jobs are closed
only at a rate s. I repeat the simulations described in Figure 4 for a collection of 16
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(b) After a negative technology shock
FIGURE 4. MULTIPLIER DYNAMICS IN EXPANSION AND RECESSION
Note: The positive shock is an unexpected increase in technology by +5.4 percent. The negative shock is an unexpected
decrease in technology by -3.6 percent. The instantaneous multiplier at time t is (n∗t − nˆt) / (g∗t − gˆt), where nˆt
and gˆt are aggregate and public employment without government intervention and n∗t and g∗t are aggregate and public
employment with government intervention. The intervention is the unexpected hiring of 0.01 percent of the labor force
in the public sector. The multiplier dynamics are obtained by simulating the calibrated New Keynesian model.
technology shocks ranging from ν1 = −0.036 to ν1 = +0.054. For each technology
shock, I compute the cumulative multiplier given by (20), and I measure the extremum
of the unemployment response without government intervention. I link each cumulative
multiplier to the associated unemployment rate and plot the 16 multiplier-unemployment
pairs in Figure 5(a). The cumulative multiplier is countercyclical: it doubles from 0.24
to 0.49 when unemployment increases from 5 percent to 8 percent. The interpretation
is that hiring 1 percent of the labor force in the public sector reduces unemployment by
0.49 percentage points in recession and by only 0.24 percentage points in expansion.19
The multiplier in Figure 5(a) has not been estimated empirically. To facilitate com-
parison with empirical evidence, Figure 5(b) displays another cumulative multiplier that
measures the percentage-point reduction in unemployment obtained by spending 1 per-
cent of GDP on public employment. This multiplier is given by an expression that
differs from (20) on two counts. First, public employment gt is replaced by its cost,
gt · wt + [gt − (1− s) · gt−1] · r · at/q(θt). Second, the expression is multiplied by
steady-state GDP, y+w ·g+s ·g ·r/q(θ), to measure the cost of public employment as a
fraction of GDP. This alternative multiplier is also countercyclical: it increases from 0.34
to 0.71 when unemployment increases from 5 percent to 8 percent. The interpretation is
that spending 1 percent of GDP on public employment reduces unemployment by 0.71
percentage points in recession and by only 0.34 percentage points in expansion. Unem-
19During the Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration was concerned that the public jobs created by the New
Deal might take away job applicants from firms, thus making it difficult to hire workers in the private sector (Neumann,
Fishback and Kantor, 2010). The numerical results address this concern by showing that crowding-out of private employ-
ment is weak in recession.
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(b) Effect of spending 1 percent of GDP
FIGURE 5. CUMULATIVE MULTIPLIERS OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Note: The multipliers in Panel (a) are given by (20). They give the percentage-point increase in aggregate employment
obtained by hiring 1 percent of the labor force in the public sector. The multipliers in Panel (b) are defined in the text.
They give the percentage-point increase in aggregate employment obtained by spending 1 percent of GDP on public
employment. Each multiplier is computed by hiring 0.01 percent of the labor force in the public sector in response to 1 of
16 technology shocks ranging from -3.6 percent to +5.4 percent. The unemployment rate on the x-axis is the extremum
of the unemployment response after the technology shock, without government intervention. The cumulative multipliers
are obtained by simulating the calibrated New Keynesian model.
ployment averaged 5.8 percent in the US from 1954 to 2006; at that rate, the multiplier
is 0.45. This value is aligned with the results of Monacelli, Perotti and Trigari (2010).
Using US data for the 1954–2006 period, they estimate a structural vector autoregres-
sion and compute a cumulative multiplier defined as that in Figure 5(b). At a two-year
horizon, they find a multiplier of 0.43.20
The level and cyclicality of the multipliers are robust to changes in public-employment
policy. Appendix B describes the multipliers obtained when public employment is a
constant fraction of private employment in absence of government intervention: for all
t ≥ 0, gˆt = ζ · lˆt, where ζ = g/l = 0.20 is the steady-state ratio of public employment
to private employment. The results are almost identical to those displayed in Figure 5.21
III. Conclusion
In this paper, I have developed a theory in which the public-employment multiplier
varies across stages of the business cycle. My analysis has two important implications
for work that estimates government multipliers. A first implication is that work that
estimates average multipliers over all stages of the business cycle may not be informative
20See Table 1, column 4 in Monacelli, Perotti and Trigari (2010).
21The level and cyclicality of the multipliers are also robust to changes in monetary policy. I redid the simulations
with a monetary policy rule that includes an output gap: Rt = (1/β) · (1 + pit)µpi · (ut/u)µu , where u is steady-state
unemployment, µpi = 5, and µu = −0.8. The values of µpi and µu are borrowed from Blanchard and Galı´ (2010). The
results were almost identical to those displayed in Figure 5.
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for the design of government policy in recessions.22 The reason is that multipliers may
be very different in recessions, compared to other stages of the business cycle. For
instance, in this model the public-employment multiplier is much higher in recessions:
in Figure 5(b), the multiplier is 0.45 at a normal unemployment rate of 5.8 percent but it
reaches 0.71 when the unemployment rate reaches 8 percent.
Estimating multipliers that account for the stage of the business cycle in which the
government increases spending is therefore essential for policy applications. Two studies
offer a promising start on this agenda. Both find countercyclical multipliers.23 Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2011) use a direct projection method that allows the multiplier to
vary smoothly with the stage of the business cycle. In data for a large number of OECD
countries, they find that the multiplier is quite large in recessions but not significantly
different from zero in expansions.24 Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) measure how an
increase in government consumption in a given US state during a military build-up af-
fects employment in this state.25 Their estimate of the multiplier is much larger when
unemployment is high than when unemployment is low.26
A second implication is that work that estimates average multipliers over all types
of government spending may not be useful to assess the effectiveness of specific types
of spending. The reason is that multipliers may be very different for different types of
spending. For instance, in this model increasing public employment reduces unemploy-
ment, but increasing government purchases of goods from the private sector has no ef-
fect on unemployment.27 Hence, estimating separate multipliers by types of government
spending is essential for policy applications.28
Several restrictions limit, however, the degree to which the theory moves us toward
a complete understanding of the role for government spending over the business cycle.
A first restriction is that in the model, public-sector jobs are identical to private-sector
jobs. But in practice, these jobs may differ. A first difference concerns wages: during
the New Deal, hourly wages were substantially lower in relief jobs than in private jobs
(Neumann, Fishback and Kantor, 2010); and on average, public-sector wages are higher
and more rigid than private-sector wages (Gregory and Borland, 1999; Quadrini and
Trigari, 2007). A second difference concerns separation rates: in the US, public-sector
22Parker (2011) made this point, and this paper offers a theoretical support for his argument.
23Other researchers who estimate such multipliers include Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Canova and Pappa
(2011), Bachmann and Sims (2012), and Holden and Sparrman (2011).
24The results are reported in Panel B of Table 3 in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011). Column 1 and 2 show that the
multiplier is 0.50 (standard deviation: 0.22) in recessions and -0.11 (standard deviation: 0.15) in expansions. A recession
is defined as a period when the detrended unemployment rate is especially high, and an expansion as a period when the
detrended unemployment rate is especially low.
25The effect of government consumption is isolated from a monetary policy response because US states are part of a
monetary union.
26Column 3 in Table IV in Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) shows that the multiplier is 1.85 when the US unemploy-
ment rate is above the median and 1.10 when the US unemployment rate is below the median. The estimates are not very
precise because the number of business cycles in the sample is limited.
27Consider the simple model of Section I. Suppose that the government purchases G units of final good from the
private sector. G only appears in the resource constraint: y = c + G + s · n · r/q(θ). In particular, G affects neither
quasi-labor supply nor aggregate labor demand. Hence, G has no effect on unemployment. However, G crowds out
one-for-one the household’s consumption of final good, c.
28Some researchers who have done so include Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and Pappa (2010).
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jobs last much longer than private-sector jobs because the separation rate in the private
sector is almost 3 times higher than in the public sector (Gomes, 2010). If jobs differ
across sectors, jobseekers will direct their search toward a specific sector. Studying the
effect of public employment in this context may be difficult, but it would offer a more
accurate characterization of the cyclical behavior of the public-employment multiplier.
A second restriction is that in the model, firms are always able to sell their entire
production at the going price such that the concept of deficient aggregate demand is
absent. This assumption explains why government purchases of goods from the private
sector have no effect on unemployment. This assumption is also unrealistic, and it is
important to relax it to analyze the effect of government purchases on unemployment.
Michaillat and Saez (2013) take a first step in this direction. They propose a new kind
of business-cycle model with trade frictions in both labor market and product market.
Unemployment and unsold production arise in equilibrium. Recessions may be caused
by technology shocks or aggregate demand shocks. They study how consumption and
unemployment respond when the government purchases goods from the private sector.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
A1. Proof of Lemma 3
Since g/l = ζ in equilibrium, the equilibrium condition for a steady state parameter-
ized by w can be written as nd(θ, w) = ns(θ), where
nd(θ, w) = (1 + ζ) ·
[
1
α
·
{
w + [1− β · (1− s)] · r
q(θ)
}] −1
1−α
.(A1)
Implicit differentiation of the equilibrium condition yields
dθ
dw
=
∂nd
∂w︸︷︷︸
−
·
∂ns∂θ︸︷︷︸
+
− ∂n
d
∂θ︸︷︷︸
−

−1
.
The signs of the derivatives come from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, which also applies to
the aggregate labor demand defined by (A1). Thus dθ/dw < 0. The other results follow
since n = ns(θ), u = 1− (1− s) · n, and l = n/(1 + ζ).
A2. Proof of Proposition 1
I first prove Parts (i) and (ii). Implicit differentiation of equation (6) yields
∂nd
∂θ
· dθ
dg
= − 1
1 + (s/d)
,(A2)
where s ≡ (θ/ns) · (∂ns/∂θ) > 0, d ≡ − (θ/nd) · (∂nd/∂θ) > 0. Next, implicit
differentiation of equation (7) yields
dn
dg
= 1 +
∂nd
∂θ
· dθ
dg
.
Combining this result with (A2) yields an expression for the public-employment multi-
plier:
λ ≡ dn
dg
= 1− 1
1 + (s/d)
.(A3)
Since s ∈ (0,+∞) and d ∈ (0,+∞), then λ ∈ (0, 1).
Next, I prove Part (iii). The first step is to express s and d as functions of endogenous
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variables. The definition of ns(θ) implies
s = (1− η) · u.(A4)
The definition of ld(θ, w) implies (θ/l) · (∂ld/∂θ) = − [η/ (1− α)] · Ω, where
Ω ≡ [1− β · (1− s)] · r/q(θ)
[1− β · (1− s)] · r/q(θ) + w.
Since nd(θ, w, g) = g + ld(θ, w) and n/l = 1 + ζ in equilibrium, I can relate d to Ω:
d = − 1
1 + ζ
· θ
l
· ∂l
d
∂θ
=
η
(1 + ζ) · (1− α) · Ω.(A5)
Lemma 3 and the fact that q is decreasing imply dΩ/dw < 0. Hence, (A5) implies
dd/dw < 0. Lemma 3 and equation (A4) imply ds/dw > 0. Thus, (A3) implies
dλ/dw > 0.
APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS
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(a) Effect of hiring 1 percent of the labor force
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(b) Effect of spending 1 percent of GDP
FIGURE B1. CUMULATIVE MULTIPLIERS WITH A CONSTANT RATIO OF PUBLIC TO PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
Note: This figure is obtained as Figure 5, except that public employment remains a constant fraction of private employ-
ment over time in absence of government intervention: gˆt = ζ · lˆt, where ζ = g/l = 0.20 is the steady-state ratio of
public employment to private employment. The multipliers in Panel (a) are given by (20). They give the percentage-point
increase in aggregate employment obtained by hiring 1 percent of the labor force in the public sector. The multipliers in
Panel (b) are defined in the text. They give the percentage-point increase in aggregate employment obtained by spending
1 percent of GDP on public employment. The cumulative multipliers are obtained by simulating the calibrated New
Keynesian model.
